This paper examines inter-generational persistence in child labor by developing a dynamic model and exploring its implications empirically in Brazil. We begin by building an overlapping generations model of the household child labor decision. We assume that this decision is made by the head of the household, where parents decide to send their child to work only if by doing so the child's contribution to the present consumption of the family outweighs the future consumption benefit the family would enjoy from keeping the child in school. The main predictions of the model are that children are more likely to work when they come from households with parents who were child laborers, from households with parents who have lower educational attainment and that child labor has adverse effects on children's educational attainment and their adult earnings.
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Is There a Child Labor Trap?
Inter-Generational Persistence of Child Labor in Brazil
I. Introduction
Child labor is a widespread phenomena in the world's economies and has been for generations. Recently, child labor has been put in the spotlight by activists, politicians and economists alike. Most of the popular discussion has centered around the harmful effects of child labor and ways to curtail its incidence. Much of the recent theoretical literature in economics (see Basu, 1999 , for a useful survey of the both the theoretical and empirical literature) has focused attention on how child labor is most likely a household decision. Most of the previous empirical literature has focused solely on isolating the determinants of child labor using survey data.
The main insight of the recent literature on child labor is this focus on examining the household as the decision-making unit. If, in fact, it is the head of the household that makes the child labor decision, as is now commonly assumed, then this raises interesting questions about the inter-generational link in child labor. There has been some preliminary theoretical work examining this link (Basu, 1999; Bell and Gersbach, 2000) but there is a marked absence of empirical work on the topic. This paper is an attempt to examine this link both theoretically and empirically. This paper examines inter-generational persistence in child labor. We begin by building a overlapping generations model of the household child labor decision.
Following Basu and Van (1998) , we begin by assuming that the child labor decision is made by the head of the household. In addition, parents decide to send their child to work only if by doing so the child's contribution to the present consumption of the family outweighs the future consumption benefit the family would enjoy from keeping the child in school. This is slightly different than the "luxury axiom" in Basu and Van (1998) . In our case the decision is not made on the basis of the families current consumption relative to a poverty line, rather it is an inter-generational comparison of current versus future consumption.
We begin with a model where each family consists of one adult and one child.
The adult values both current consumption and the educational attainment of the child.
Educational attainment as a child determines the wage earnings of the adult. A child can either go to school and/or work. The amount of time spent working detracts from the total educational attainment of the child and thus diminishes the child's earnings once he/she reaches adulthood. Thus families with little education are more desperate for the contribution to current consumption the child can provide than are families with high education, and therefore it is the low education families that will send their children to work while high education families will not.
After constructing the model, we look for evidence of persistence in child labor by examining household survey data from Brazil. We exploit the fact that the survey data includes information on child labor of both parents and children in a household as well as information on the educational achievement of the grandparents. We find that people who start work at an earlier age end up with lower educational outcomes, that those who start work at a younger age end up with lower earnings as adults, and that children are more likely to be child laborers the younger their parents were when they entered the labor force, and the less education of the grandparents. These findings are all consistent with our model of child labor persistence.
Together the model and the empirical results paint a vivid picture of persistence in child labor between generations. The policy implications of these findings are important as it demonstrates that there may be a critical level of resources needed to extract families from the child labor trap, after which no further resources are necessary. This is in stark contrast to many current policies that suggest resources be directed to all children generation after generation. As Basu and Van (1998) demonstrate, it is quite likely that the poor rely on child labor only to assure survival and, given a choice, would always opt for educating their children. This paper demonstrates that, in this case, appropriate policy response is to concentrate on the condition of each family rather than focusing on individual children.
II. The Model
Consider a household that consists of two agents in each period: an adult and a child. Each agent lives for two periods (child and adult), and upon reaching adulthood each agent creates a child, making this a standard overlapping generations model. All adults are identical, as are all children. There is no population growth and we shall normalize the total population to the unit interval. We assume that the adult in each period makes the decision of whether or not to send the child to work (and thus forgo at least some education). In addition, total human capital accumulation (from total education as a child) is the sole determinate of adult wage. We shall normalize the child wage to 1 and this is assumed to be the same as the wage for an adult worker with no education.
We shall first present a general model and after, a specific model with an analytic solution. This model is closely related to the model developed by Glomm (1997) in that the adult makes the education choice for the child.
In each period the adult's utility is given by the function:
where c t is the period t consumption of the family and h t+1 is the human capital achievement of the child.
Adults are endowed with one unit of time in each period. As adults, all of the agent's time is spent working and earnings are given by the production function:
where w t a is the income of the adult and h t is the stock of human capital of the adult. The young are also endowed with one unit of time which can be divided between schooling and work. By assumption, the child wage is normalized to 1, so a child who spends all of his or her time working will earn $1. Generally, the child's production function is:
where w t c is the earnings of the child in period t, and e t is the time spent in school, and
. Total family earnings at time t is given then by:
The budget constraint for the family is:
which will bind by non-satiation as long as the marginal utility derived from increased consumption is always greater than zero.
We assume that there exists a technology that converts education as a child into adult human capital, or:
where
We can substitute the constraints into the objective function (1) and derive the adults problem:
Let e* be the solution to the adult's problem. We can now express the optimal education level of the child as a function of the adult's human capital:
and the law-of-motion is then:
Consider a Φ function that is shaped as in Figure 1 . Here there arise multiple equilibria, two stable and one unstable. One stable equilibrium exists at h t = 1 and the other at h t = h . The unstable equilibrium is at h t = h*. In fact h* is a critical value of human capital attainment for when the adult's human capital is below h* the child will end up with even less human capital until the family reaches the steady state of h t = 1, where the children do nothing but work. Alternatively, if the adult's human capital is above h*, the child will end up with more human capital than the adult and the family 6 eventually reach the steady state of h t = h , where the children do no work and attend school full-time.
Figure 1
To give a more concrete example consider a utility function of the Cobb-Douglas type: 
, and 1 > Θ . Θ can be interpreted as returns to education or simply as the educated adult wage rate. Again, if an adult has no education then he or she commands a wage of 1, the same as a child laborer.
We can solve this problem analytically as the adult's decision is now a binary one: send the child to school or to work. The adult will send the child to school (e t = 1) if and only if:
After plugging in the budget constraint (and noting that non-satiation holds with this utility function), this decision rule becomes:
Which reduces to:
So (12) defines the critical value h* where adults that have human capital h* and above will send their children to school full time and those that do not will send their kids to work full time. Thus there are two steady-state equilibria in this model, at full education and at no education. This is illustrated in Figure 2 .
Figure 2
For a wide range of parameterizations,
. For example if Θ = 1.75 and
. It is also interesting to note that h* is increasing in α , and 45 1 1 h h decreasing in Θ . Thus the more weight the adults places on current consumption as opposed to the child's human capital achievement, the more likely the adult is to make the choice of zero education. In addition, the higher the returns to education, the more likely the adult is to make the choice of full education.
While this model presents a polar version of the child labor choice, we believe it illustrates well the fundamental inter-generational link between child labor of the parents and their offspring, a link that we shall explore empirically in the next section.
III. Empirical Evidence from Brazil
The Data
The data used in this study come from the 1996 Brazilian Household Surveys The child labor variables for the kids are constructed as follows. A child is considered to work if he or she worked on the labor market any strictly positive hours in the survey week of reference. Moreover, A child is considered to work full time if he or she worked 20 hours or more on the labor market in the week of reference. Both definitions of child labor will be used to check the robustness of the results.
The child labor variable for the parents is defined as follows. The PNAD survey asks each individual the age at which he or she start to work Thus, if a parent began working in the labor market at 14 years old or below, he or she is considered to have been a child laborer.
For each child, we also obtain his or her school attendance status, race, gender and region of residence. Similarly, we constructed years of schooling, age and employment status of the parents. The definitions of all variables used in the analysis are reported in the appendix. 1996. Of all 10 to 14 year old children in the sample, 13.9 percent worked in the labor market. 70.6 percent of their fathers were child laborers and 37.2 percent of their mothers started working at age 14 or below. More importantly, of all child workers, 87.4 percent come from a family in which the father was a child laborer, and 64.4 percent belong to a family where the mother was a child laborer. Although these results are unconditional probabilities, they strongly suggest the existence of inter-generational persistence in child labor in Brazil.
The Empirical Models
To test the inter-generational effect of child labor we estimate four different models. The first is a probit of child labor on parents child labor status and a vector of other controls. The second is a linear regression of the age at which the child entered the labor force against the age at which the parents started work plus a set of control variables. The empirical literature on child labor emphasizes the fact that the child labor decision is in fact a joint child labor and school attendance decision (see Grootaert and Patrinos, 1999) . In order to account for this decision structure, we estimate two different models, which depend on the assumptions of the decision making process. Thus, the third model uses a sequential probit model following Grootaert and Patrinos (1999) in which the school versus work decisions are assumed to be made sequentially. The fourth model is a multinomial logit model which assumes that the decision is made on all of the options simultaneously. Given that we are primarily concerned with the child labor persistence, and that the main results hold for all models, we will present the first two models in the text and refer the reader to the appendix for the sequential probit and multinomial logit results. We believe that the two models presented below are sufficient evidence to support our main hypothesis.
The Inter-Generational Persistence of Child Labor
To estimate the effect of parental child labor on the incidence of work among youths aged 10-14, we first estimate a standard probit model. The dependent variable is an indicator that equals one if the child worked any strictly positive hours in his/her main job in the week of reference 4 . This is regressed on indicator variables that equal one if the child's mother and father were child laborers, variables for the number of years of schooling of each of the parents and interaction terms which multiply the parent's child labor indicator variables with their years of schooling. Also included is the age of the child, the age of the parents, the number of brothers and sisters aged 0-5, 6-9, 10-14 and 15-17, and indicators for if the child is female, lives in an urban area, has a father that does not work, has a mother that does not work 5 . The results are shown in the first column of Table 2 .
We find that parental child labor has a strongly positive effect on the probability that a child is in the labor force, that the years of schooling of the parents have a strongly negative effect and that coefficient on the fathers child labor and years of schooling interactive variable is positive and significant. These results indicate that a child is more likely to be laborer if his/her parents were child laborers, less likely the more educated are his/her parents and that the marginal effect of education of the father having been a child laborer is negative but smaller if he was a child laborer. Moreover, a female child or a child in urban areas is less likely to work in the labor market. Also, the greater the number of siblings aged 5 to 14, the more likely the child is to work.
In order to evaluate the impact of the grandparents' education on child labor status of the grandson or granddaughter, we also estimate two probit models that include the years of schooling of grandparents as explanatory variables. Column 3 of Table 2 presents the results of a regression that excludes parents' education and the interaction of their education and their child labor status. Column 5 of Table 2 shows the coefficients from the complete set of regressors. When we exclude the years of schooling of parents, we find that the more educated the grandparents are, the less likely to work the child is.
However, when we include the parents' education variables, the years of schooling of grandparents become insignificant. These results suggest that there is no direct link between grandparents' education and child labor status of the grandchild. This effect appears to operate through the education of the parents only.
The Effect of Age Started Working
An alternative way to evaluate the inter-generational persistence of child labor is to estimate the effect of the age at which the parents entered the labor force on the age at which the child starts to work. We expect that, ceteris paribus, the older the parents entered the labor market the older the child began working. For this we estimate a linear regression where the dependent variable is a continuous variable of the age the child started working and the independent variables are the same as in the probit models except that now the variables for the parent's child labor are continuous variables for the age at which each entered the labor force and those variables squared. Also the interactive terms now interact the age the parents entered the labor force with their education.
Note however that the dependent variable is censored since we only observe the age started working of those children that are actually in the work force. To account for this selectivity bias we additionally estimate a Heckman selection model where the additional variables in the first step are indicator variables that equal one if the father (mother) does not work. The results of both models are shown in Table 3 .
Again, the results for all models are essentially the same. The age at which they entered the labor force for both father and mother has a positive effect on the age at which the child enters the labor force but the marginal effect declines as the parents enter later. Years of schooling for both parents has a positive effect on the age the child starts working but the coefficients are no longer significant (father is at the 10% level). When we perform a heckman correction the years of school of the mother becomes significant.
Once more, the grandparents' years of schooling have no direct impact on the age at which the child starts to work, as revealed by the last two models of Table 3 .
Cost of Child Labor
So far we have shown strong evidence of inter-generational persistence of child labor in Brazil. However, in order to explain why we should be concerned with the incidence of child labor, it is important to look at the economic consequences of child labor in a person's life. One main negative effect of child labor is the potential for child labor to hamper the ability of the adult to generate higher future earnings.
In order to assess the impact of having been a child laborer on current earnings, we estimate a simple OLS regression and a Heckman selection model for both mothers and fathers in the sample, separately. Here we regress the log of current earnings on years of schooling, age and age squared, age they started work and its square, an interaction of years of schooling and age started work, and the race and urban indicator variables. For the selection-bias corrected estimations we add the family composition variables in the first stage regression. The results are given in Table 4 .
For both fathers and mothers the coefficient on the age they started work is positive and significant. Meaning that child labor has a negative impact on current earnings controlling for education and other variables. This means that the negative aspects of loosing out on education outweigh the possible positive effects of gaining experience as a child laborer. The squared term is negative meaning that the impact lessens the older the individual enters the labor force.
Because of the age started work -years of schooling interaction term, the optimal age to start work depends on the years of schooling. For a male with no schooling, the optimal age is 12, with four years of schooling (the end of primary education), 16, and with eight years (the end of secondary education), 19. So for an illiterate male it is better to start working as a child, but when one considers the work -school tradeoff this means that the individual is forgoing future earnings from the attainment of more human capital.
For a female the age started work -years of schooling interaction term is not significant, so for any level of schooling the optimal age to start work is 20 years old.
IV. Conclusion
This paper presents an overlapping generations model of inter-generational child labor persistence and finds strong evidence of such a link in Brazil. The results suggest that there is a significant relationship between parent's child labor incidence and schooling, and those of their children. We find that children are more likely to be child laborers if their parents were as well. In addition, children attain higher levels of education the more education their parents have. Moreover, the educational attainment of grandparents does not directly affect the child's labor status, but there seems to be an indirect impact that is transmitted through the parents' education. Finally, earnings as an adult are lower, ceteris paribus, the earlier the individual enters the labor market.
Together, these results paint a striking picture of the inter-generational persistence and harmful effects of child labor within families.
This suggests that the household should be treated as a whole when it comes to designing policies aimed at reducing the incidence of child labor. These policies are important because in this paper we also show that child labor has harmful effects on individual's earnings abilities as adults. Thus the negative effect of the loss of educational attainment is greater than the positive effect of gaining experience as a child
laborer.
So what is shown in this paper is that the overall harmful effects of child labor extend well beyond the childhood years. The same child laborer as an adult does worse than a person who was not a child laborer, and that child laborer is much more likely to have to resort to sending his of her own child to work. Thus the cycle continues. It is important then to break this cycle within each household in order to achieve a lasting, long run, reduction in child labor in a society. Policies that are able to break this cycle, family by family are potentially the most effective instrument to reduce the incidence of child labor. This type of policy would likely involve a one-time transfer of a critical level of resources to a family rather than continual support of children's education.
Appendix A: Sequential Probit and Multinomial Logit Models
In this appendix we consider the child labor decision to work as a joint decision to attend school.
Sequential Probit
This model considers the work v. school choice to be a sequential choice and therefore we estimate a sequential probit model. Here we consider a choice structure where households first decide whether to send the child to school full-time, then, if not, whether to send the child to school part-time and to work part-time, then, if not, whether to send the child to work full-time or have the child neither work nor go to school. To do this we estimate a sequence of conditional probits where the first includes all observations, the second excludes those who are in school full-time and the third excludes those that either go to school full-time or go to school part-time and work parttime. These results are given in Table A1 .
The pattern in the sequential probit model is the same as the normal probit for the school full-time versus all other choices. That is, parents having been child-laborers has a negative effect on the probability the child goes to school full-time and that the more years of schooling the parents have the more likely the child will attend school full-time.
When the choice is to go to school part-time and work part-time versus going to school full-time or doing nothing some interesting results occur. The child labor and schooling variable of the father are no longer significant. The mother having been a child laborer, and having more schooling, has a positive effect on the probability that the child will attend school part-time and work part time versus no school at all (work full-time or do nothing). Finally when the decision is to work full-time or do nothing, the coefficient is positive and significant on the mother having been a child laborer indicator variable and negative and significant on the fathers years of schooling.
Multinomial Logit
The multinomial logit model considers the same choices as above, but this time assumes that households make this choice at one time (rather than sequentially). To test Table A2 .
The results here follow the same general pattern as the normal probit. Parents having been child laborers has a positive effect on the probability that the child will be in the labor force, and parents years of schooling has a negative effect. The interactive term for the father is positive and significant for the work and school choice (relative to the full time school choice). Number of boys in the family aged 0 to 5 years b69
Appendix B: List of Variables workmj
Number of boys in the family aged 6 to 9 years b1014
Number of boys in the family aged 10 to 14 years b1517
Number of boys in the family aged 15 to 17 years g05
Number of girls in the family aged 0 to 5 years g69
Number of girls in the family aged 6 to 9 years g1014
Number of girls in the family aged 10 to 14 years g1517
Number of girls in the family aged 15 to 17 years (25) 0.25 * Statistically significant at the 5% level. ** Statistically significant at the 1% level. White's heteroskedastic consistent errors used in both regressions. 
